

THE ARMY'S INLAND TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO THE  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

JOSEPH KEVIN WHITE, MAJOR, USMC  
B.S., USNA, Annapolis, MD, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Joseph Kevin White

Thesis Title: The Army's Inland Transportation Support Requirements to the United States Marine Corps

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
LTC James O. Coogle, B.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Mr. David W. Christie, M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Dennis L. Dolan, Ph.D.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>17 JUN 2004</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Army's inland transportation support requirements to the United States Marine Corps</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Joseph White,</b>				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>US Army Command and General Staff College,1 Reynolds Ave.,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027-1352</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER <b>ATZL-SWD-GD</b>	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT <b>Title 10 states that the four service components are responsible for the logistical sustainment of their forces. This responsibility remains constant whether at garrison or deployed. Department of Defense directives and joint and service doctrine all attempt to provide further refinement to Title 10. Unfortunately significant disparities between these documents exist, and assigning logistical responsibility to a single commander is problematic. Joint logistical operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom were challenging. Prior planning for the integrated use of inland transportation assets was completely scrapped, and service components had to fill the resulting transportation shortfall with contracted host nation assets. Had the area of operations been more austere, and local trucks not been available, or had the host nation assets withdrawn due to fear of combat loss, the logistical sustainment of the combat force would have failed. Joint doctrine prohibits service component commanders from establishing duplicate logistical capabilities, deviating from the combatant commanders common user logistical plans, and failing to meet all of their services' logistical needs. The contradictory nature of these three requirements reduce the service component commanders ability to meet the service logistical requirements, and highlight the requirement of review of Title 10, DOD Directives and joint and service doctrine.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>1</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>77</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## ABSTRACT

THE ARMY'S INLAND TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, by Major Joseph Kevin White, USMC, 63 pages.

*Title 10* states that the four service components are responsible for the logistical sustainment of their forces. This responsibility remains constant whether at garrison or deployed. Department of Defense directives and joint and service doctrine all attempt to provide further refinement to *Title 10*. Unfortunately significant disparities between these documents exist, and assigning logistical responsibility to a single commander is problematic.

Joint logistical operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom were challenging. Prior planning for the integrated use of inland transportation assets was completely scrapped, and service components had to fill the resulting transportation shortfall with contracted host nation assets. Had the area of operations been more austere, and local trucks not been available, or had the host nation assets withdrawn due to fear of combat loss, the logistical sustainment of the combat force would have failed.

Joint doctrine prohibits service component commanders from establishing duplicate logistical capabilities, deviating from the combatant commanders common user logistical plans, and failing to meet all of their services' logistical needs. The contradictory nature of these three requirements reduce the service component commanders ability to meet the service logistical requirements, and highlight the requirement of review of *Title 10*, DOD Directives and joint and service doctrine.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	iii
ACRONYMS .....	vi
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Research Question .....	2
Assumptions.....	3
Definitions of Terms .....	3
Limitations .....	5
Delimitations and Scope .....	6
Significance of Study.....	6
Conclusion .....	7
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	9
Introduction.....	9
Current Laws, Directives and Doctrine .....	9
<i>Title 10</i> .....	9
Directives.....	15
Joint Doctrine.....	16
Interservice Doctrine.....	34
Army Doctrine .....	35
Professional Journals .....	40
What were the inland transportation support agreements for OIF? .....	41
Conclusion .....	42
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	43
Introduction.....	43
Research Question and Subordinate Questions .....	43
Investigatory Steps.....	44
Research Criteria.....	46
Conclusion .....	46
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS .....	48
Introduction.....	48

Findings .....	50
Research Answers.....	53
Conclusion .....	54
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	55
Introduction.....	55
Research Question .....	55
Recommendations .....	56
Implications .....	57
Recommendations For Further Study .....	59
Summary.....	60
REFERENCE LIST .....	62
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	66
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .....	67

## ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Report
ADCON	Administrative Command
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARFOR	Army Forces
ASCC	Army Service Component Commander
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
BSSG	Brigade Service Support Group
CGFOR	Coast Guard Forces
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIS	Common Item Support
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command
COMARFOR	Commander Army Forces
COMASCC	Commander Army Service Component Command
COMMARFOR	Commander Marine Corps Forces
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element
CUL	Common User Logistics
CULT	Common User Land Transportation

DA	Department of the Army
DMC	Distribution Management Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
EAR	Executive Agent Responsibility
FM	Field Manual
FSSG	Force Service Support Group
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host-Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
IAW	In Accordance With
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Command
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Command
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Command
JMC	Joint Movement Center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JP	Joint Publication
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
JSOCC	Joint Special Operations Component Command
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
LOC	Line of Communication



LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MCA	Movement Control Agency
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MLC	Marine Logistics Command
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSR	Main Supply Route
NAVFOR	Navy Forces
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SITLM	Single Integrated Theater Logistics Manager
T-JMC	Theater Joint Movement Center
T-JTB	Theater Joint Transportation Board
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TSC	Theater Support Command
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USC	United States Code
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Joint Force Components .....	18
Figure 2. Command Component Allignment.....	36
Figure 3. Theater Logistics Support.....	38
Figure 4. Proposed Functional Component Allignment.....	57

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the current laws, directives, joint service doctrine, and Army doctrine to determine if the inland transportation support the US Army provides the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is adequately identified and documented, and does the need exists to clarify or amend these existing laws, directives, joint and Army doctrine in order to facilitate the adequate identification of inland transportation support requirements and responsibilities in joint operations. Another issue related to this topic is the misconception that many officers in both the Army and the USMC have regarding what these responsibilities are and the details of this support arrangement. Ask any Army or Marine officer where can the interservice responsibilities of the US Army in regard to providing support to the USMC be found, and the officer will undoubtedly say “*Title 10*.” This misconception of the scope of *Title 10* is not difficult to believe when one considers the countless articles in professional magazines, books, briefs from both headquarters, school house lesson plans, and others, all of which list the general theater logistical support requirements of the Army as a “*Title 10* responsibility.” This research will attempt to dispel this notion through an in-depth study of joint, interservice, and Army publications, to quantify the transportation piece of the Army’s theater logistical responsibilities, and to provide a brief study of the mechanism that is supposed to provide this support.

In order to quantify the interservice transportation support responsibilities, the researcher will analyze the pertinent documentation from *Title 10* down to single service

publications and compare these responsibilities with the force structure that is designed to meet these requirements. An analysis of the interservice support from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will provide sufficient data to determine the overall success of this support. OIF will be used as the benchmark for evaluating the success or failure of support due to OIF being a major regional contingency that employed all US Armed services in a conventional manner. That is to say that OIF demanded the activation and deployment of Reserve and National Guard forces, deployment of significant Active Forces, and the implementation of an operational war plan, executed at the combatant commander level. All other contingencies since Desert Storm have been less than operational war plans and therefore have not fully mobilized the resources of the US armed forces.

#### Research Question

The primary question to be answered by this research is as follows: Is the inland transportation support the US Army provides to the USMC adequately identified and documented, and does the need exist to clarify and amend these existing laws, directives, joint and Army doctrine in order to facilitate the adequate identification of inland transportation support requirements and responsibilities in joint operations? In order to adequately answer this question, several other issues will need to be addressed:

1. What are the Army's theater inland transportation support responsibilities to the USMC?
2. How is the current Army theater support structure organized to support the inland transportation support requirements of the USMC?

- a. What is the force makeup (Reserve/Active forces) in these support organizations, and how does that affect their performance?
  - b. What is the chain of command for joint inland transportation service providers?
3. How successful were these organizations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?
4. What are the inconsistencies and gaps between doctrine and the capabilities of the Theater Support Command?

If the Theater Support Command (TSC) is the primary provider of joint theater support, then the service it provides, and the time in which it provides it, must meet the needs of the customer. If the customer is forced to go elsewhere to meet his logistical needs, then the very utility of the support structure is in question.

#### Assumptions

As in all research, assumptions are essential to adequately address the topic in hand. This research is no different, and two key assumptions have shaped the research. First, that lessons learned, from both the US Army and the USMC, are reliable, objective, and representative of common issues related to the theater transportation problems of OIF; and second, that after-action reports (AAR) are reliable sources, that provide objective assessments of strengths and weaknesses.

#### Definitions of Terms

Some key definitions must also be established in order to focus the scope of this research in the general area of transportation. Theater support is all logistical support to all forces assigned to a particular theater of operations, which exceeds the organic

capability of the supported units. Generically, theater support consists of the operational-level logistical assets and is a general support asset providing support to all designated joint customers. Army field manuals (FM) tend to use both “theater support” and “Army theater support” interchangeably. This research will clearly differentiate between the two to eliminate the confusion evident in doctrine. Army theater support will indicate combat service support (CSS), from echelons above corps, provided to Army forces only. Theater support will indicate CSS, from echelons above corps, provided to all forces in theater. Inland transportation support is all transportation assets that distribute personnel and supplies (all classes of supplies: I-IX), starting at the initial port or airhead point of entry into theater, and ending at using units’ locations. Theater distribution is an all-encompassing term that indicates air and ground assets used in the movement of all theater assets, to include personnel and supplies.

The Army also delineates between the service component commander, and the Army forces commander. The Army service component commander (ASCC) is the commander assigned component commander responsibilities for all Army forces in theater. These responsibilities include all *Title 10* logistical, administrative, and support requirements. The Commander Army Forces (COMARFOR) is responsible for all Army forces assigned to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). These responsibilities include the operational employment of forces, movement of forces into theater, and sustainment of forces once in theater. The ASCC and the COMARFOR may be the same General Officer, or may be two officers, with the ASCC subordinate to the COMARFOR. If the COMARFOR is also assigned as the Joint Force Land Component Commander, the Theater Support Command commander is often assigned the ASCC title.

In order to establish the minimum logistical requirements of forces, the term “core logistical capabilities” is used in *Title 10*, and throughout this research. This term signifies the amount of military logistical forces necessary to meet all of a theaters combat service support (CSS) requirement. Core logistical capability does not include any host nation (HN) assets or other contracted logistical capability.

The term executive agent is used throughout this research to indicate the service component responsible to the Department of Defense (DOD) for oversight of a necessary function of support that involves two or more of the DOD’s components. DOD Directive 5101.1, published 3 September 2002, further defines executive agent as follows:

DOD Executive Agent: The Head of a DOD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DOD Components. The nature and scope of the DOD Executive Agents responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall:

Be prescribed at the time of assignment.

Remain in effect until the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or supersedes them.

#### Limitations

Although much has been written about the conflict in Iraq, many lessons learned and after-action reports (AAR) have not yet been released. The exact details of the logistical interservice agreements and responsibilities are described in Annex D of the classified operational order for OIF. Because of this classification issue, no direct reference will be made from these documents. However, there are unclassified sources that provide information as to the nature of these agreements that allow for the

determination of success or failure of theater-level support as directed in the planning phase of OIF.

### Delimitations and Scope

The scope of this research is limited to theater distribution as this area provides the best picture of overall success of logistics support. For example, should inland transportation fail to deliver the Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) products, the POL support would also fail, or should inland transportation fail to deliver the Class IIX (medical materials) supplies, the medical support would also fail, and so on. The research is also limited to theater distribution below the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) level. The responsibility of USTRANSCOM to manage the movement of equipment, supplies and personnel into theater do not directly influence the scope of this research. Although this organization has some responsibility in a combatant commanders area of responsibility (AOR), the focus of this research is on the intra-theater distribution piece. This intra-theater distribution is further defined as the movement of all materiel, supplies and personnel within the combatant commanders AOR.

### Significance of Study

Army doctrine, professional journal articles, command briefs, Command and General Staff (CGSC) lesson plans, and others, all cite *Title 10* as the source for Army responsibilities to sister services for a host of theater level support requirements. This core assumption is essentially wrong. As such, Army doctrine has been written based on incorrect assumptions, and does not necessarily reflect the reality of a combatant commander's AOR. The reality within a combatant commanders AOR is that many



commanders are tasked with logistical responsibility for various units, depending on the service support requirements, common user logistics (CUL) agreements, local area support agreements, and others. CUL are defined as logistical services that are common to all services, such as food and water support, small arms ammunition, POL products, and others. Another significant piece of this study is the effectiveness of the structure that is supposed to provide this support to the USMC. If the Army's doctrine assumes that the CUL responsibilities will fall to the Army, then it's force structure should reflect an organization designed to fulfill that obligation.

There also exists a huge rift between doctrine and law. Doctrine attempts to reduce logistical redundancy in a theater by assigning the combatant commander directive authority for logistics. Theater distribution is an assigned responsibility of the combatant commander. By law, the service secretaries are assigned the task of providing forces to the combatant commander, and sustaining these forces. As such, the service secretaries direct representative, the service component commander, is assigned a duplicative mission, and is often competing for scarce resources in a theater with the other service component commanders (*Title 10*, sec. 2464, sec 164, sec 165).

### Conclusion

A methodical study of the pertinent documents, starting with law, and ending with organizational doctrine, will provide an overall understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the armed services. These responsibilities, when compared to the capabilities of the force designed to provide them, reveal significant shortcomings in the structure of the Army's combat service support (CSS) community. Also, current law, joint doctrine and Army doctrine leave many areas of conflict in establishing logistical

responsibilities in theater. The individual secretaries of the services are charged with sustaining the forces they provide to the combatant commander. No matter how the combatant commander organizes the forces provided to him, or how he ensures the adequate pooling of resources to reduce redundancy, the service secretaries are not relieved of their *Title 10* responsibilities. Should the combatant commanders logistical support concept fail, the direct representative of the service secretaries, the service component commanders, will also have failed, but instead of violating doctrine, they will have failed to meet their lawful obligation.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The fundamental issue within this thesis is the area of conflict within, and between, law, directives, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine. At times multiple commanders (combatant commanders, multiple service component commanders and their subordinate commanders) are tasked with similar or identical support responsibilities. Providing this support while coordinating between services, in order to reduce or eliminate redundancies is difficult. It also calls for an immense amount of collaboration in order to maintain effective accountability of responsibilities throughout the process. An overview of the pertinent laws, directives, and doctrine is needed to provide an understanding of the various duties and responsibilities of the multiple commanders. A comparison of these documents will address the areas of conflict, and identify the need for further guidance in logistical doctrine.

#### Current Laws, Directives and Doctrine

##### *Title 10*

*Title 10* differs significantly from military doctrine in one very important area – its requirements must be met. Doctrine is a guide for the commander; designed to assist the commander in the accomplishment of assigned missions, whereas *Title 10* is law. The responsibilities delineated by *Title 10* must be accomplished, and its tenants must be adhered to. Deviation from *Title 10* requires congressional approval, and failure to achieve these lawful requirements is not an option. Therefore, both joint and single service doctrine cite *Title 10* as the point of reference for their development. However,

the leap from *Title 10* to doctrine is not always accurate. For instance, “The Army Service component commander (ASCC) is specifically responsible for service-related U.S. Code (U.S.C.) *Title 10* tasks to prepare, train, equip, administer, and provide combat service support (CSS) to Army forces assigned or attached to combatant commands (FM 4-93.4)” without further specification as to where in *Title 10* this responsibility is directed. But *Title 10*, Subtitle B, PART I, CHAPTER 303, Sec. 3010, Sec. 3013 actually states:

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions:

- (1) Recruiting.
- (2) Organizing.
- (3) Supplying.
- (4) Equipping (including research and development).
- (5) Training.
- (6) Servicing.
- (7) Mobilizing.
- (8) Demobilizing.
- (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
- (10) Maintaining.
- (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
- (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

The *Title 10* logistical responsibilities of the Department of Defense are very specific. Subtitle A, PART IV, CHAPTER 146, Sec. 2464, Para (a)(1), states “It is essential for the national defense that the Department of Defense maintain a core logistics capability that is Government-owned and Government-operated to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other

emergency requirements.” In other words, the Department of Defense must have sufficient logistical assets to sustain its forces in time of crisis. Para (b)(1) of the same section goes on to say “. . . performance of workload needed to maintain a logistics capability . . . may not be contracted for performance by nongovernment personnel under the procedures and requirements of Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 or any successor administrative regulation of policy.” Not only is the Department of Defense required to maintain core logistical capabilities, by law these capabilities may not be contracted out to non-Governmental organizations. There is of course a caveat to the above requirement that allows the Secretary of Defense to determine if the “performance of the workload is no longer required for national defense reasons” then the capability may be contracted out, but a waiver must be obtained from Congress for any long term contract capability.

*Title 10* is also very specific in its logistical authority it places on the combatant commanders. For example, Subtitle A, PART I, CHAPTER 6, Sec. 164, Para (c)(1) states the following:

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of -

(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;

(B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;

(C) organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

(D) employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

(E) assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;

(F) coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and

(G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g) of this section and section 822(a) of this title, respectively.

Bottom line, this gives the combatant commander the authority to organize logistical forces and control resources and equipment within his respective AOR. The combatant commanders subordinate commanders are also assigned duties and responsibilities within *Title 10*.

In regards to subordinate commanders of the combatant commanders, their duties are also expressly delineated in this same section, Para (d) as follows:

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense -

(1) commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c);

(2) the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command;

(3) other elements of the Department of Defense shall communicate with the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority under subsection (c) in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command; and

(4) if directed by the commander of the combatant command, the commander of a command or force referred to in clause (1) shall advise the commander of the combatant command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority under subsection (c).

In summary, the combatant commander has the authoritative direction over subordinate commanders in all aspects of logistics, and the subordinate commanders are responsible to the combatant commanders for the same. The combatant commander can also reorganize both personnel and equipment assigned, and can assign command functions to subordinate commanders. Overall the authority for the combatant commander, and the subordinate commanders to delineate functions on the battlefield encompasses all elements of the battlefield operating system (BOS), to include logistics. The combatant commander can assign any force to any mission he feels necessary to accomplish his assigned missions.

This ability to adjust assigned forces seems to make complete logistical sense. The combatant commander is directly responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the success of assigned missions. However, in the same chapter as above, Sec. 165, states the following:

(b) Responsibility of Secretaries of Military Departments. -

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the authority of commanders of the combatant commands under section 164(c) of this title, the Secretary of a military department is responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned by him to a combatant command.

(c) Assignment of Responsibility to Other Components of DOD. -

After consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense may assign the responsibility (or any part of the responsibility) for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands to other components of the Department of Defense

(including Defense Agencies and combatant commands). A component assigned such a responsibility shall discharge that responsibility subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the authority of commanders of the combatant commands under section 164(c) of this title.

What this section does is assign the responsibility of administration and support of forces firmly on the shoulders of the secretary of the military department (Navy (to include the USMC), Army, Air Force) to which forces belong. Para (c) does allow the “Secretary of Defense to assign the responsibility, or any part of the responsibility, for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands to other components of the Department of Defense.” This is directly in conflict with Sec. 164. In essence *Title 10* states that the Secretary of Defense has directive authority for administration and support of all forces, the service secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of their unique services, and the combatant commander has directive authority for logistics and administration of forces assigned to his AOR. The ability to manage logistical assets and assign logistical responsibilities becomes increasingly difficult when one considers the echelons of influence and levels of responsibility that *Title 10* dictates.

The final section of *Title 10* pertinent to this research is in Subtitle B, C, and D, Chapters 303, 503 and 803, Sections 3013, 5013 and 8013 respectively. Para (c)(5) in each of these sections state that the service secretaries must do the following:

Provide effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Army/Navy/Air Force and the other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication.

This paragraph directs the service secretaries to plan for the use of a Sister service capability necessary to accomplish their assigned tasks. When considered at a strategic



level, that makes sense. For example, the individual purchase of meals ready to eat (MREs) by each service makes no sense if you consider that each service would be competing against the other services for both meals, and transportation to move those meals. Whereas the single purchase, single move to theater capability that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides eliminates interservice competition, and all services get their required MREs at a lower cost. But when reduction of duplicative logistical capabilities is considered at the operational level, this is almost impossible to accomplish. This is especially true when you consider the similarities between the ground forces of the Army and the Marine Corps. Basic life support functions such as laundry, showers, electricity generation, transportation, and maintenance, are all essential in the accomplishment of both services missions, yet all represent a duplicative capability between the two services responsibilities that *Title 10* dictates.

Department of Defense has published several directives that attempt to address this issue by assigning an individual service Executive Agent Responsibilities (EAR) for a particular function or capability. One such directive is directly related to the transportation mission of the Army.

#### Directives

Department of Defense Directive 4500.9, published on 26 January 1989, addresses transportation and traffic management for all Department of Defense agencies. The Secretary of the Army is assigned the following responsibility:

4.3.2. Make common-user land transportation available in overseas areas to the other Military Departments as agreed and assigned by the Unified Command Commander. Coordinate the planning requirements for the use of DOD-controlled land transportation equipment and facilities.

To clarify, the Secretary of the Army is directed by the Secretary of Defense to provide land transportation assets to the combatant commander to fulfill the theater land transportation mission, and plan for the theater use of all DOD-controlled rolling stock and facilities within the combatant commanders AOR. So in effect, all DOD land transportation assets and facilities that support land transportation in theater are, by this directive, under the planning authority of the Secretary of the Army.

#### Joint Doctrine

One would assume the extensive use of service and joint doctrine to refine the requirements in *Title 10* and DOD Directives would serve to eliminate these areas of conflict. However, because the requirements within *Title 10* are in such violent disagreement with each other, and DOD Directive 4500.9 assign total responsibility of land transportation to the Secretary of the Army, doctrine simply serves to muddy the waters as it often contradicts both.

JP 0-2, the *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF, 2001), was written to “provide the basic doctrine and policy governing the unified direction of forces and discuss the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components.” In Chapter I, page 9, paragraph 9(c), it states, “Each of the secretaries of the Military Departments . . . has the responsibility for . . . providing forces to fulfill specific roles and for administering and supporting these forces.” It further specifies in paragraph 9(d), “Commanders of forces assigned to the combatant commands are under the authority, direction, and control of (and are responsible to) their combatant commander to carry out assigned operational missions, joint training and exercises, and logistics.” Not only must the service components provide required forces to a combatant commander, they must

also assign sufficient logistical support forces to adequately support all forces from their service. In fact, each joint force must include a service component “because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components” (UNAAF 2001, V-3). A standard joint force component diagram is depicted in figure 1. The UNAAF also advises the Joint Force Commander (JFC) – “The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the service and functional component commanders; however, the service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistics) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC...The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the service organizations” (UNAAF 2001, V-4). Logistic authority is retained and exercised by the service logistic support system, in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments. An assigned responsibility of the service component commander is “Logistic functions normal to the command” (UNAAF 2001, V-18).

Often JPs incorrectly cite *Title 10*. For example, JP 3-33, *Joint Forces Capabilities* (1999), states, “*Title 10* USC responsibilities include requirements to organize, equip, train, and maintain Army forces in the theater and to provide support to other services in accordance with executive agent responsibilities” (JP 3-33 1999, II-3). Although the “organize, equip, train, and maintain” is correct, the “provide support to other services” is fabrication.




Figure 1. Joint Force Components

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001), V-3.

In the JP 4 series, further detail of joint logistics is delineated. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (2000), restates many of the same responsibilities as laid out in JP 0-2. However, in Annex B, JP 4-0 provides further guidance to the J-4 to establish a joint movement center (JMC) in order to “implement the tasking and priorities provided by the combatant commander” (JP 4-0 2000, B-3). The JMC is tasked to

coordinate all transportation assets in theater (to include allied, and Host Nation (HN) assets) in support of the concept of operations. By establishing theater transportation policies within the area of responsibility (AOR), the JMC is responsible to the combatant commander for de-conflicting transportation assets and facilities that affect multiple service users. The JMC also serves as the liaison to both host nations and coalition partners, and is the conduit for all information regarding “HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel” (JP 4-0 2000, B-4). JP 4-0 also states that the J-4 “directs or recommends to the combatant commander, as appropriate, courses of action (COA) with respect to allocation of common-user transportation capabilities when movement requirements exceed capability or when competing requirements result in unresolved conflicts” (JP 4-0 2000, B-3/4). Finally, JP 4-0 mentions the establishment of a Joint Transportation Board at the JCS level. This board, a wartime or contingency body, ensures the effective use of all DOD common-user transportation assets “in meeting competing and/or conflicting combat commander movement requirements” (JP 4-0 2000, B-8).

JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System* (2003), states “Transportations resources must be coordinated and maintained during peacetime as well as during times of war” (JP 4-01 2003, viii). During peacetime, the services maintain responsibility for their movement requirements, and submit air, sea and civilian land transportation requirements directly to USTRANSCOM. During wartime or contingency operations, the “combatant commanders, in coordination with the supporting combatant commanders and services, establish movement requirements and priorities by developing a deployment and/or redeployment plan for joint operations” (JP 4-01 2003, viii).

USTRANSCOM executes combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of all transportation assets, with the important exception of service-unique or theater assigned assets, in the DOD, and is the single manager for transportation. The JMC is also further tasked within JP 4-01, by assignment of the responsibility as “single coordinator of strategic movements between the combatant commander and USTRANSCOM and should oversee the execution of the theater transportation priorities” (JP 4-01 2003, III-9). The service components are also assigned specific responsibilities within JP 4-01. For example, the Department of the Army (DA) is responsible for the following:

- (a) Making land transportation available in overseas areas where they are the dominant user, normally under the control of a combatant commander’s Army service component commander, for the Military services; and

- (b) Coordinating all planning and requirements for the use of DOD-controlled land transportation equipment and facilities. However, commanders of overseas areas maintain control and authority over their service-owned assets to ensure accomplishment of their mission.

The Departments of the Navy and Air Force are assigned the following responsibilities:

- (a) Submitting to DA peacetime requirements for common service theater or area transportation for those theaters where the Army has been assigned common-user land transportation responsibility (wartime COMMON-USER LAND TRANSPORTATION requirements are the combatant commanders’ responsibility, and normally the joint movement center or component assigned the mission will consolidate planned wartime movement requirements of all component commands); and

- (b) Providing organic land transportation support within their installations and activities. Additionally, they will arrange other land transportation service with DA or as directed by the JFC.

This assignment assumes that the Army is designed to, and has the equipment, personnel, command structure, and organization necessary to provide this common-user land transportation capability to all forces in theater. It does not discuss what organization within the DA will be assigned this mission.

Theater distribution gains more clarity in subordinate joint publication JP 4-01.4, *Joint tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution* (2000). This publication defines the theater distribution system as the “third segment of the defense distribution pipeline (JP 4-01.4 2000, viii),” (the first two segments being those that facilitate the arrival of assets into theater). The geographic combatant commander is again identified as the responsible authority for managing all aspect of theater distribution, and this distribution takes place by the managed use of various joint and service component units. The combatant commanders responsibility extends from the airport or seaport of debarkation to the operational area. The primary purpose of centralizing control of the theater distribution responsibilities is to “prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the service component commands” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-6). The ability of the combatant commander to influence this overlap/duplication is dependent on whether it is during peacetime, or wartime. Under peacetime conditions, legislative (*Title 10* various) responsibilities remain in effect, and logistical responsibilities remain a service component responsibility. During wartime, or crisis action, “the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their mission” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-6). This wartime clause in joint doctrine is interesting in that it is not supported by the legislation (*Title 10*, various) that it cites. So regardless of the joint publication authority relieving the service component commanders of their logistical responsibilities and assigning it to the combatant commander, law does not allow them to do so. The combatant commander is also assigned the following responsibilities; “manage all intra-

theater movement of assets (including commercial or vendor shipments); Determine requirements for additional intra-theater assets and lift capability; and, monitor the status, capability, and availability of mobility assets” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-6).

The service component commanders are also assigned, as identified in senior joint doctrine and legislation, responsibility for the logistical support of their own forces.

There is an “unless” clause in JP 4-01.4 that reads “unless services can augment organic logistic capabilities through support otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies, allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-Service agreements” (JP 4-01.4, p. II-8). The service components are also responsible for “direct communications with appropriate headquarters on all logistic matters” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-8). The service component responsibilities are also broken out by service. For example, the Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR) is tasked to do the following: “Provide common item and common service support to other components as required; provide common-user land transportation in theater to include rail otherwise designated by the combatant commander; and, provide management of distribution assets and prioritize movement requirements and mode asset utilization” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-8). The primary ARFOR unit designated to provide this support is the Theater Support Command (TSC).

Specifically, the TSC is designed to deploy in modular capability packages that provide required support at the theater level. The traditional logistical functions resident in the TSC are “supply, maintenance, and field services” and may also include transportation should the COMARFOR request it. The mission of the TSC, as explained in JP 4-01.4 is to “plan and manage Army distribution operations.” This mission is accomplished through the use of a movement control agency, a material management center, a



distribution management center, and contracting and Host-Nation Support (HNS) resource managers resident on its staff.

JP 4-01.4 also assigns the Marine Service Component significant responsibilities for Marine specific logistics. “Theater distribution operations will be conducted under the direction of the Commander, Marine Forces (COMMARFOR), and its task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-11). The combat service support element (CSSE) of the MAGTF is tasked to provide the theater distribution logistic support to the MAGTF “that is so vital to successful operations.” The COMMARFOR may also establish a Marine Logistics Command (MLC) for this theater support mission. The MLC is a tasked-organized unit, generally assigned to a Force Service Support Group (FSSG) or Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). The role of the MLC is to “support the identification, preparation, and submission of HNS, interservice support, inter-theater, and intra-theater requirements for the Marine Service Component” (JP 4-01.4 2000, II-12). The MLC is also responsible for the “interaction with other theater logistic agencies as they arrive” (JP4-01.4 2000, II-13). Consequently while each service is assigned responsibility for its own logistical support, and each service (Army and Marine Corps) has its own theater level logistical organization (TSC and MLC), the ARFOR, through the TSC, is the provider of all common-user land transportation in theater.

The final pertinent section in JP 4-01.4 is the Joint Theater Distribution Operations chapter, Chapter IV. The roles and missions of the various staffs and boards is discussed, to include the combatant commander’s J-4, the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), the Joint Movement Center (JMC), and the Joint Transportation Board (JTB).

Overall responsibility of theater level logistics is assigned to the combatant commanders J-4 Staff. By the use of boards, centers, and committees, the J-4 prioritizes lift requirements, distributes resources, and manages logistical tasks in accordance with the OPLAN. The LRC has four key functions:

- (1) Monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities:
  - (a) Are any planned operations in jeopardy because of logistic limitations?
  - (b) Are there any operations that cannot be supported?
- (2) Coordinates logistic support with upcoming operations:
  - (a) Recommends to combatant commander shifting of logistic support from one Service component or one geographic area to another in the theater.
  - (b) Assesses materiel commonalties among the Services for possible cross leveling.
  - (c) Remains cognizant of the location of Service component distribution resources and capabilities.
  - (d) Tracks materiel en route and within the theater.
  - (e) Interprets the various Service-unique means of measuring supply levels.
- (3) Advises the combatant commander on the supportability of various Courses of Action (COA) for proposed operations:
  - (a) Coordinates with Service components as they perform their supportability analysis.
  - (b) Provides a gross analysis of COAs at the combatant command level.
- (4) Acts as the combatant commander's agent and advocate to non-theater logistic organizations by:
  - (a) Reporting logistic status to the Joint Staff Logistic Directorate.
  - (b) Requesting additional resources.
  - (c) Overseeing priorities conveyed to supporting organizations.
  - (d) Overseeing adjustments to the flow of forces and supplies.
  - (e) Coordinating logistics with allies.

The Theater-JTB (T-JTB) is used to resolve any contentious transportation issues within the command, at both the operational level (within theater), and the CJCS JTB is

used for allocation/de-confliction of USTRANSCOM assets between service components. The T-JTB is also responsible for “coordinating the employment of all modes of theater transportation (including that which is provided by allies, coalition partners, or HN) to support the theater concept of operations at the operational level with the JTF JMC of component movement center,” and, “the T-JMC is the single coordinator for all movement into, through, and out of the theater” (JP 4-01.4 2000, IV-7).

JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control* (2002), is similarly confusing, assigning the same responsibilities to multiple agencies. For example, the Army component is again tasked with providing common-user land transport, and regulating the movement of all shipments in the theater through the use of a Movement Control Agency (MCA) (JP 4-01.3 2002, III-6). The MCA fielded by the ARFOR, positions movement control elements throughout the theater in order to monitor theater logistical throughput and manage traffic. As stated above, this management is also a T-JMC responsibility.

JP 4-01.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Transportation Terminal Operations* (2002), places the responsibility for theater logistics firmly on the shoulders of the Geographic combatant commander. Two designated tasks read as follows:

Ensuring that the departure and arrival of transportation organizations are sequenced to provide support to units that have yet to deploy and sustainment to those already forward.

Establishing a transportation system to support the forward presence or deployed force within the joint operations area (JOA) (JP 4-01.5 2002, I-11).

These two tasks duplicate, and confuse the service components logistical responsibilities. For example, the service component is responsible for providing forces to the combatant commander, coordinating with USTRANSCOM for the movement of those forces to the

theater, and logistically supporting those forces once they arrive. Should the combatant commander shift logistical assets around within theater or adjust arrival dates of transportation organizations, the service components may have difficulty meeting their own logistical requirements.

JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations* (2001), is the most direct of the joint publications series. It states:

In all joint operations, the Service component commands retain overall responsibility for logistic support of their forces except when there are valid agreements or directives for the provision of CUL support outside of the normal Service component channels (JP 4-07 2001, vii).

This section is referring to the Secretary of Defense's ability to "assign the responsibility (or any part of the responsibility) for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands to other components of the Department of Defense (including other Service Departments, Defense Agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, and other combatant commands)" (*Title 10* various, Part I, Chapter 6, Sec 165). But as stated before, this authority does not relieve the service secretaries of their administrative and logistical duties, as delineated in *Title 10*, Subtitles B, C, and D.

The combatant commander is again assigned additional logistical responsibilities in JP 4-07. These additional duties include:

Overall effectiveness and economy of the joint force, service component, and applicable agencies' logistical plans.

Establishment of the critical item list and allocation of critical distribution and CUL resources.

Allocation of critical logistic resources.

Prioritization of the joint theater distribution and logistic effort by phase or operation.

Management of all intra-theater movement of assets.

Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the service component commands.

Achievement of required economies through proper and detailed delegation of directive authority for common-item support to the appropriate joint force, service component, or agency as either lead organization and/or as formal single integrated theater logistics manager (SITLM).

Clear identification of detailed logistic planning and specific lead CUL organizations designations, responsibilities, and CUL execution parameters in the OPLAN and/or OPORD.

Planning and resourcing of communication and/or information networks to support distribution.

Establishment of a theater capability to capture and maintain total asset visibility of common-user materiel and services (JP 4-07 2001, II-5).

All of these functions assume that the combatant commander has the infrastructure to accomplish the above assigned tasks. This is a broad assumption, and depending on the flow of forces into theater, the required forces to accomplish the above missions may not be readily available.

Of extreme interest in JP 4-07 is the following: “The combatant commander directive authority **does not discontinue service responsibility for logistic support** even if it is being executed by another service or agency” (JP 4-07 2001, II-6). However, further in the same paragraph, “Subordinate joint force and service component commanders do not have the authority to deviate from the combatant commander’s CUL plans or directives without formal combatant commander approval” (JP 4-07 2001, II-6). So if the CUL plan or directive fails to meet the service component commander’s logistical needs in support of assigned missions, the service component commander must

be able to fill the logistical need from his own resources, as he still has overall logistical responsibility for all service forces in theater. However, the very presence of these additional logistical forces violates the combatant commander's task of preventing or eliminating "unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the service component commands" (JP 4-07 2001, II-5). Essentially, the service combatant commanders are tasked to follow the combatant commanders CUL plan, fulfill all other logistical requirements of their respective service, eliminate redundant and duplicative logistical capabilities from the AOR, and be prepared to fulfill all CUL plan shortfalls with their own assets. The ability to meet all four tasks is impossible as the service component commanders are never relieved of their service obligation to meet all the logistical requirements of their respective services.

The J-4 is also saddled with additional tasks in JP 4-07:

Determine overall joint force functions and requirements.

Review all service support requirements as they relate to determining CUL requirements.

Determine the source of support (military, civilian, HN, or other).

Recommend specific lead joint force service, or agency CUL responsibilities to the combatant commander.

Coordinate CUL support IAW tasking assigned in Annex D ("Logistics") to the OPLAN or OPORD.

Coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions for US and multinational support logistic exchange issues with the appropriate service component, agency, and/or multinational points of contact. (JP 4-07 2001, II-6)

The service component commander's responsibilities are the same as in previous publications, however the additional delimitation of "direct communication with appropriate headquarters (HQ) on all logistical matters" is also mentioned (JP 4-07 2001,

II-7). Further specificity allows the “Service component commands [to] implement and execute administrative and logistic functions via their ADCON authority over all subordinate service forces in the AOR. Service component commands also remain responsible for direct communications with appropriate HQ on all logistical matters” (JP 4-07 2001, II-7). This authority fails to mention the stipulation in *Title 10*, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, Sec. 164, Para (d)(4), which, as cited previously, states that the subordinate commanders to a combatant command “shall advise the commander of the combatant command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority.” As the combatant commanders are assigned directive authority for logistics, the combatant commander has the authority to impose himself in the ADCON chain of command, between the service component commanders, and the service chiefs.

The concept behind CUL capabilities makes fiscal sense. The capabilities of the service forces to provide this support varies from service to service. The preponderance of CUL capabilities for land-transportation resides in the Army. As stated in JP 4-07, some Army CUL capabilities are designated in formal DOD level executive agency responsibilities, such as outlined previously. However, JP 4-07 advises that most of the Army’s CUL-capable units are reserve force units, and therefore will not be ready to meet the immediate needs of the combatant commander (JP 4-07 2001, IV-5). The identification of a CUL requirement, identified by the combatant command J-4, once the service component commands identify an individual shortfall, gets tasked to the ARFOR component commander. The ARFOR, using his direct communications authority to

appropriate HQ, identifies a requirement for a transportation asset to HQDA. HQDA, with the permission of the President, mobilizes the asset from the reserve force, ARFOR inputs the reserve unit in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), and a minimum of 90 days later, the unit shows up in the AOR. This is not responsive logistics. The ability to project combat-power, and immediately have the capability to sustain that combat force for an indefinite period of time requires the ability to deploy combat forces at the same time as combat service support forces. That is responsive logistics.

Finally, JP 4-07 mentions Host-Nation Support (HNS). Often the combatant commander designates one service component to be the lead agency for contracting and HNS agreements. That lead service is then responsible for properly coordinating and integrating the HNS and contracts into the CUL logistic plan. JP 4-07 also warns that HNS should not provide such a significant portion of logistic capabilities that the withdrawal of this support jeopardizes the accomplishment of assigned missions (JP 4-07 2001, IV-23). The only service staffed to conduct this mission would be the Theater Support Command (TSC). As stated previously, the TSC has contracting and HN resource managers on its staff.

JP 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI)* (2000), also recommends using a single service as the nucleus for JRSOI. Although other methods of conducting JRSOI are mentioned, the single service/predominate service concept for overall management is the preferred method (JP 4-01.8 2000, II-12). The service responsible for JRSOI is then responsible for continually reviewing and validating “the TPFDD to determine its



mission support requirements and request changes to its support force structure” (JP 4-01.8 2000, III-13). Again, the unit organized to facilitate RSOI for the Army is the TSC.

Finally, the joint publications arena provides CJSC Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance* (1999). This manual provides guidance to combatant commands for publication of Operational Plans (OPLANS) and Operational Orders (OPORDS). In Enclosure C, Annex D, Planning Guidance – Logistics, paragraph 3 states the minimum requirements for preparation of Annex D (CJCSM 3122.03 1999, C-282):

### 3. Execution

- a. Concept of Logistic Support. State the logistic concept for support operations to implement the plan including HNS joint logistic plans or joint lines of communications plans.

- b. Tasks

- (1) Assign logistic support responsibilities to Service component commanders and define the logistic support required from other commands for preparation of supporting plans.

- (2) Assign support responsibilities to joint boards, such as for transportation and procurement, and others providing services.

Under Section 4, “Administration and Logistics,” paragraph a, “logistics,” sub-paragraph

(1), “Supply and Distribution,” the combatant commander is directed to address

interservice logistic support as follows (CJCSM 3122,03 1999, C-284):

- (g) Inter-Service Logistic Support. (See Joint Pub 4-0.) Provide the required planning information including type and quantity of support and instructions where inter-service arrangements for common supply and service support are appropriate.

- 1. Summarize major support arrangements that are presently in effect or that will be executed in support of the plan.

2. Include significant inter-Service support arrangements. (Refer to appropriate annexes or appendixes.)

The preparation of this section requires the combatant commands to know what the service components are going to bring to the theater, what logistical capabilities they will have in excess, and what capabilities they will not bring in anticipation of using CUL assets.

Also directed in this manual is the submission of a mobility and transportation appendix containing the information described below:

- a. When submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each OPLAN will include a mobility and transportation appendix in the format prescribed in this manual. The appendix will be submitted concurrently with the OPLAN (CJCSM 3122.03 1999, C-305).

The OPORD mobility and transportation appendix must also address the supporting and subordinate command responsibilities.

2. Responsibilities of Supporting and Subordinate Commands. Outline the specific responsibilities of supporting and subordinate organizations for moving and receiving passengers and cargo and for providing movement resources and services in the objective area. Include such items as:

- a. General transportation responsibilities or a statement about where they are listed in the reference.

- b. A summary of transportation requirements to support the plan, including:

- (1) Theater airlift required to support the plan.
- (2) Strategic airlift required to support the plan.
- (3) Strategic sealift required to support the plan.
- (4) Theater sealift required to support the plan.

- c. A description, in general, of the responsibilities of the JTF commander until he relinquishes his command.

d. A description, in general, of the transportation responsibilities of the component commands and host nations to support the plan. Such responsibilities might include common-user port, air terminal, prepositioned 463L pallets, reception staging, and surface transport services; allocation of theater transport resources; or submission of transportation requirements for deployment, employment, resupply, sustainment, and deployment operations.

e. A description of the Joint Movement Center (JMC) organization (if established) outlining transportation responsibilities at all command levels to support deployments, reception, and sustainment of forces. The JMC description should show the interface with USTRANSCOM and their components as well as organizational interface between the supported and supporting combatant commanders, components, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). (Reference Joint Pub 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for Movement Control*)

The basis of this requirement is to establish a theater level logistical support structure that does not violate any of the principles laid out in joint doctrine. However, as already established, much of the required information, what CUL capabilities will be resident in theater, and when will they be available for use, is a service secretary/component commander responsibility, and may not be known until the service component has written its own OPORD, which is generated after the combatant commanders OPORD is already published. Also, HNS plans are generally established to fill in a capability that is not readily available at the service component level, and, according to Joint Doctrine 4-07, must not constitute such a significant capability that withdrawal of the assets jeopardizes the accomplishment of the mission. Again, this type of information will not normally be available before the identification of service component capabilities, and service component shortfalls.

Joint publications leave the service components, combatant commanders, service component commanders and functional area commanders with much to untangle with regards to logistical responsibilities. Rather than delineate clear and concise guidance that

complements the responsibilities demanded by *Title 10*, they assign multiple distinct tasks to multiple commanders, such as responsibility for logistics. Not only must the service component commanders plan for the logistical support of all service specific forces, they must also plan their own logistical redundancies to counter shortfalls in CUL capabilities. The failure of CUL does not relieve the service component commander from the responsibility to provide logistical support to component forces in theater.

The combatant commander faces a similar problem in that the J-4 section is responsible for functions that it is not manned to execute. The primary logistical agency, supposedly designed to support a joint theater, is the TSC. However, the TSC does not report directly to the J-4 in the execution of its duties, but belongs to the ARFOR, and as such is the only logistical agency responsible to fulfill the ARFOR *Title 10* requirement of support to all Army forces assigned to the combatant command. All other Army logistical units are subordinate to the tactical forces, assigned to the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and therefore are not generally available to perform CUL tasks.

#### Interservice Doctrine

Interservice doctrinal publication FM 3-31.1/MCWP 3-36, *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations* (2001), is only mentioned in this research to highlight the lack of information that it provides to solve the myriad of problems associated with CUL issues. Chapter IX, page 1, defines the principles of directive authority for administration and logistics, and prohibits the geographic commander from delegating this responsibility. The combatant commander may however, “direct authority for common support capability within the joint force joint operations area (JOA) to the

JFC, service component, of DOD agency.” This delegation is usually given to the “dominant user of a particular logistical commodity or service” (FM 3-31.1 2001, IX-1). The remainder of Chapter IX discusses the various logistical organizations within the MEF and the ARFOR, and the capabilities that each organization can provide to its sister service, in the unlikely scenario that these assets be cross-attached.

### Army Doctrine

As all joint publications suggest, the United States Army is the dominant provider of CUL capabilities. The Army service component commander (ASCC) therefore assumes the role of CUL provider for the majority of CUL functions. The primary logistical organization designated to fulfill these responsibilities, as stated previously, is the TSC. Per FM 4-93.4, *Theater Support Command* (2003) –

The ASCC commander determines the composition and flow of TSC elements into an AO. Within an AO, the ARFOR commander determines the scope of TSC responsibilities over the array of operational-level support functions, based on the ASCC commander’s plan and subsequent guidance (FM 4-93.4 2003, 2-4).

As already discussed, the responsibility for CUL identification, and subsequent tasking to a service component is a JTF J-4 responsibility. If the Army is the primary provider of CUL capabilities, the TSC the primary source of those capabilities, and the J-4 the responsible agent for delineation of CUL responsibilities, the determination of “composition and flow of TSC elements into an AO” should lie with the J-4. The chain of command of the TSC is also established in FM 4-93.4 (see figure 2). The TSC will remain under the ARFOR commander; however, it may still be tasked to “provide lead service CUL support throughout the JOA” (FM 4-93.4 2003, 2-4). Although functional component alignment (figure 2) does not depict the service component commands, as per the UNAAF, they are still present and will perform required support in accordance with

their service component responsibilities. The figure also has the TSC falling under the JFLCC. This will only occur should the ARFOR be dual assigned as the JFLCC.




Figure 2. Command Component Alignment

Source: FM 4-93.4 2003, 2-5.

Of special interest in FM 4-93.4 is the addressing of executive agent responsibilities. The primary purpose of executive agent responsibilities is to “reduce the redundancy across the DOD and assist the services in programming, planning, and budgeting” (FM 4-93.4 2003, 1-6). Therefore the assumption of executive agent responsibility for transportation and traffic management, as directed in DODD 4500.9 (discussed previously), should provide the Army with sufficient documentation to budget for CUL responsibilities.

FM 100-10-1, *Theater Distribution* (1999), was written and designed to “assist Army service component commanders, Army force commanders, theater support command commanders, logistics support element commanders, and other Army CSS personnel and their staffs in translating requirements and needs into combat service support in joint, multinational, and interagency environments” (FM 100-10-1 1999, iii). As such, its relevance in discussing joint theater responsibilities is pertinent in that the TSC is designated to be the primary provider of theater joint logistical assets. This common logistic support is depicted in figure 3. This FM also designates the TSC as the theater logistical opener that can “operate air and sea ports, prepare routes for onward movement, negotiate with the host nation (HN) for real estate needed for marshaling areas and staging bases, provide initial sustainment and medical support, coordinate movements within the theater, and accomplish other support missions as specified by the ASCC” (FM 100-10-1 1999, 1-4).




Figure 3. Theater Logistics Support

Source: FM 100-10-1, 1999, 1-5.

As the Army theater logistical agency, the TSC is tasked with preparing an Army theater distribution plan. This distribution plan is “used by the ASCC/ARFOR to execute Army theater-wide distribution” (FM 100-10-1 1999, 5-11). This plan is published as an appendix to the service support annex of the ASCC/ARFOR service support plan. The service support plan is the overarching plan that specifies the “theater concept of support, support relationships, priorities of support, and task organization for support of the force” (FM 100-10-1 1999, 5-12). The distribution plan should explain “exactly how the distribution management center (DMC),” (a subordinate staff section on the ARFOR G-4 staff) “will maintain asset visibility; adjust relative capacity; and control the flow of



supplies, services, and support capabilities in theater” (FM 100-10-1 1999, 5-12). The use of the word “theater” in this, and many other sections, serves to obfuscate the type of support the TSC provides to other services. For example, the TSC is designated as the “theater manager” for Class I (water and rations), II (Jackets, boots, and others), III(B) (POL bulk), III(P) (POL packaged), IV (building materials), V (ammunition), VIII (medical supplies), and IX (repair parts) supplies, lines of communication (LOC) and infrastructure management, and several other logistical functions (FM 100-10-1 1999, Annex A, B and C). The reader is left to differentiate between Army theater capability/responsibility, and joint theater capability/responsibility.

FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (1995), is currently under revision, and will eventually be released as FM 3-93. Although not yet published in its final form, FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations* (2003), has been released in a CGSOC Draft version. This version has some interesting insight into the roles and missions of the Army in theater operations. For example, one of the first mentions of logistics reads: “Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, service component commanders retain responsibility for performing service-specific functions, as required by *Title 10*, and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and service intelligence operations” (FM 3-93 draft 2003, 4-9). However, 4 pages later, the following appears: “The Army’s Theater Support Command (TSC) may be tasked to coordinate this support” [operational level logistics] “as the joint operational-level support organization. The TSC will have a modular headquarters that will serve as the COMASCC” [Commander Army Service Component Commander] “of the JFLCC’s single point of contact for the execution of

theater-level logistics” (FM 3-93 draft 2003, 4-13). On the one hand the logistics support of service components is a service component responsibility, but on the other hand, the TSC is the “single point of contact for the execution of theater-level logistics.” Although FM 3-0 (2001) has replaced FM 100-5 (1993), the definition of unity of command found in FM 100-5 (1993) is still relevant: “Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.” Assigning responsibility of logistics to the service component commander, and then assigning execution authority to the TSC/ARFOR, violates the principle of unity of command.

#### Professional Journals

The above issues vary from the subtle to the glaring, and it is only through real world application of solutions that these problems get highlighted. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States Marine Corps formed a Marine Logistics Command (MLC), based around 2nd Force Service Support Group (FSSG), to facilitate the operational logistical requirements of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The below excerpt from the August, 2003 edition of *Marine Corps Gazette* highlights some of these problems:

Early planning inaccurately assumed the Army would provide for combat service support (CSS)/common item support (CIS) requirements. Often, Army and Marine combat units arrived before their organic logistics support, and although not planned, the lack of Army line haul and other logistics units required the Theater Support Command (TSC) to become the alternate, vice primary, means of line haul and theater-level transportation support. MLC became the primary source for Marine Corps battlefield distribution and CIS. Theater common user land transportation assets were available only after MLC assets were completely committed. This process left the MLC no reserve for emergent requirements or distribution targets of opportunity. Bridging the requirements gap, MLC contracted over 300 cargo and fuel tanker trucks including drivers from 14 different countries. Heavy-lift requirements were sourced from the TSC;

however, without coalition forces land component command priority of effort, Marine forces received only a small allocation of Army heavy lift during combat operations.

The extended battlespace and limited theater line haul support demanded MLC contract host-nation support to provide services and support functions unavailable via service or joint channels (Lehnert, Wissler 2003, 31).

The success of Marine Corps Logistics Command during OIF came at a cost of violating many principles laid out in joint and Army doctrinal publications. The question to ask of course is was MLC right to do so? Had MLC not contracted its own host nation assets, Marine Corps logistics would have been unable to fulfill all the MARFOR requirements. As the MARFOR Component Commander has logistical responsibility for all Marine forces in theater, failure to sustain the force would not be allowed to happen. Therefore, MLC created its own “reserve” logistical capability, fulfilled its requirements, and did so independently of the established “Theater” Support Command.

#### What were the inland transportation support agreements for OIF?

The 377th Theater Support Command was the assigned theater logistics agency for OIF. Their mission statement was as follows:

The 377th theater support command deploys to the AOR; conducts joint reception, staging, and onward movement; sustains the force with echelon above corps forces; provides distribution management; rear area operations; and, on order, conducts humanitarian assistance and redeployment operations for CFLCC forces (377th Command Brief, delivered at CGSC, 24 November, 2003).

During this brief, many of the theater level responsibilities assigned to the 377th were also highlighted. Some of these responsibilities included; joint RSOI, MSR security, and theater distribution management. Nowhere in the brief does it delineate “Army” theater logistics, from “Joint” theater logistics. As is evident from the previous article in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, the plan was for the 377th TSC to be the joint force provider for

theater level logistics. When the capabilities of the TSC could not match the requirements placed upon it, the component commander was left with no choice but to cover for these deficiencies.

### Conclusion

There were many factors that limited the 377th Theater Support Commands ability to meet all of the theater demands for its assets. None of these factors however, influenced the outcome of OIF. Service component logisticians, Army, Marine, Air Force and Navy, all overcame resource shortfalls, adjusted assets internally, and made the logistical efforts succeed. The fact that these efforts succeeded despite throwing the proverbial “book” out is a testament to flexibility of the military logistician, and the “can-do” attitude of the men and women that make up the CSS community. However, the fact that the Army’s logistical responsibilities to the United States Marine Corps are not properly documented; law, directives and doctrine that are published are often contradictory; and blind obedience to directives and doctrine would inevitable ensure the failure of service component commanders in meeting their *Title 10*/lawful responsibilities, leaves vast room for improvement in law, directives, and doctrine.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

Although fundamentally the logistical operations that supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were hugely successful, much of this success was due to the ability of service component logisticians to identify logistical shortfalls, and fill those voids prior to their affecting combat operations. The OIF operations order Annex D, the logistical section of the order, had several tasks assigned to services that were inevitably, unable to fulfill them. These tasks were assigned based on law, directives, and doctrine (both joint and Army). The incongruities between the three were dismissed; the plan was formulated and later published. The fact that the actions on the ground differed significantly from the plan is the impetus for this research.

Logistics is inherently scientific. Historical data, models, spreadsheets, vehicle fuel usage, water consumption rates, and others, are all the tools of the military logistician. However, the art of logistics is the intangible quality of translating all of this copious data, and formulating a concept of support that is flexible, responsive, attainable, survivable, simple, economical, and sustainable (JP 4-0 1995, II-2). If law, directives and doctrine do not help the logistician in meeting these principles, then revision of these applicable documents is warranted.

#### Research Question and Subordinate Questions

The principle question of this research is: Does the need exist to clarify/amend the existing laws, directives, and joint/Army doctrine in order to facilitate adequate identification of inland transportation support requirements/responsibilities in joint

operations? In order to adequately answer this question, several other issues will need to be addressed:

1. What are the Army's theater inland transportation support responsibilities to the USMC?
2. How is the current Army theater support structure organized to support the inland transportation support requirements of the USMC?

What is the force makeup (Reserve/Active forces) in these support organizations, and how does that affect their performance?

- a. What is the chain of command for joint inland transportation service providers?

The answer to these questions is best illustrated when compared against the actual implementation of inland transportation support, and the ability, or inability, of the providing service to meet the needs of the supported service. As discussed in Chapter Two, the most recent example of where common-user land transportation was planned for implementation was OIF. Therefore, defining the inland transportation support responsibilities, sub-question one, and comparing these requirements against the force that is designed to provide these services, sub-question two, will fulfill this need.

#### Investigatory Steps

The documentation of combat service support is easily traced as no military force is expected to operate without logistics. *Title 10* lays out the logistical responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the service component secretaries, and the combatant commanders, and these responsibilities are all encompassing. Department of Defense Directives have been written to further refine logistical responsibilities of the service

component commanders, reduce redundancy, define executive agent responsibilities, and eliminate confusion. Joint doctrine is designed to “govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations” (JP 4-0 1995, I). Finally Army doctrine is designed to assist the Army in “employing land power in support of the national security strategy and the national military strategy” (FM 1 2001, iv). Army doctrine is also used to delineate “The Army’s purpose, roles, and functions as established by the Constitution; the Congress in *Title 10*, USC; and the Department of the Defense Directive 5100.1” (FM 1 2001, iv).

An in depth study of the above documents, as they apply to logistics, is the basis of this research. The initial impression of this researcher was that *Title 10* was the directive authority for logistical support capabilities the Army must provide to the other services. This misconception was soon remedied, and this revelation spurred the new direction this research took. Identifying the joint logistical requirements, the Army’s joint theater logistical capabilities, and reviewing the data of recent operations in Iraq, will provide an idea of the shortfalls in capabilities and documentation in the joint theater logistical arena.

All documents reviewed, *Title 10*, DoD Directives, and joint publications, establish baseline requirements of logistical support within the Department of Defense. A comparison of the requirements, contrast of the differences, and the ultimate identification of inconsistencies is the basis of the investigatory steps taken in this research.

### Research Criteria

As *Title 10*, Department of Defense Directives, and joint and Army doctrine are all directive in nature, all require in depth study in order to establish the baseline of support required at each echelon and who is supposed to provide this support. The inclusion of command briefs and recent articles highlight the shortfalls of the current systems, and assist in the identification of solutions to theater logistical problems. Operation Iraqi Freedom is not only the most recent, but also the most appropriate venue to measure the effectiveness of theater logistical agencies. OIF was essentially a conventional operation in that land and air forces built up combat power and the combat service support necessary to conduct offensive operations, the conduct of operations was planned and executed by a combatant commander and for the most part, conventional/doctrinal methods of employment of ground and air forces were used in the execution of the plan. Operation Enduring Freedom on the other hand, was a crisis action plan, devoid of long range operational planning, and as such, more a theater for the “make it happen” logistician, than the “lets do what doctrine says” logistician. Therefore, the scale used to measure the success or failure of theater level logistical agencies, as they compare to their doctrinal requirements and capabilities, will be OIF.

### Conclusion

The hierarchy of law, DOD Directive, and joint and Army doctrine lends itself to a methodical approach to research. However, the duplicative, overlapping, and often-unclear direction of these documents obscured the anticipated narrowing of the logistical focus and responsibilities of the military services and commanders. As the findings in Chapter 4 will indicate, the effectiveness of the theater logistical agencies in OIF fell far



short of the requirements laid out in doctrine, due to the inability of the TSC to provide these services, and due to the unclear directives and doctrine designed to assist the commander in his logistical planning process.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

The methodical study of law, DOD Directives, joint doctrine, multi-service doctrine and service doctrine is long and tedious process. The authors of each are attempting to provide limitations, guidance and direction to commanders and staff, and aid them both in the execution of their duties. However, when these documents do not complement each other, or worse, contradict each other, commanders and their staffs are left with the unfortunate responsibility of deciding which obligation they are going to fulfill. The inland transportation support responsibility of combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders is the focus of this analysis. Determining what those responsibilities are is the initial objective of this research. Secondary to that is the determination of who is supposed to fulfill these requirements, and how effective are they at meeting the requirements. Finally, the use of data from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the baseline for a measure of success of interservice inland transportation support, as OIF is the most recent operation that essentially should have occurred according to current doctrine.

During OIF, Army logistics support to USMC forces at the operational level fell far short of anticipated success. This shortfall was due in part to the failure of the Theater Support Command (TSC) to meet its operational logistics requirements. Initial planning indicated that significant line haul capability would be provided to the USMC by the Army to meet the operational logistical requirements of I MEF (Lehnert, Wissler 2003, 31). Due to several issues, all of which are beyond the scope of this research, the TSC

was unable to fulfill these requirements, and the Marine Logistics Command (MLC) had to compensate. To fill this void, MLC contracted over 300 cargo and fuel trucks, driven by third country nationals (TCN), for the duration of the operation. Without these contracted vehicles, the logistical sustainment of I MEF would have been impossible. The loss of these assets would have significantly reduced the capability of COMMARFOR to support I MEF, violating a principle guideline in *JP 4-07* that warns reliance of HNS should not be so great that withdrawal of this support would jeopardize the success of operations. But these requirements were driven by necessity, and failure to fulfill them would have been unacceptable.

Current common understanding is that the TSC is a theater level logistical provider. Both Army doctrine and joint doctrine point to the TSC as the combatant commanders logistical force in readiness. However, this organization is incapable of meeting the requirements it is assumed it will fulfill. This inability is due to several factors. Firstly, the TSC is an ARFOR/ASCC organization, and unless the JFLCC is assigned as both the ARFOR and the JFLCC, the TSC is not subordinate to the JFLCC. The unity of command issue comes to play here, and competing requirements, the JFLCC's and the ARFOR's, would leave the TSC commander with a dilemma he is not suited to resolve. Secondly, the TSC is mostly a reserve organization, and unless there is a significant amount of time to mobilize these forces the TSC commander would not have sufficient forces to fulfill either his ARFOR responsibilities, or his theater level responsibilities. And thirdly, the primary mission of the TSC is to meet the ASCC/ARFOR *Title 10* responsibilities. Should combatant commander logistical tasks compete with required SCC *Title 10* responsibility, it is probable that Secretary of the

Army and/or Secretary of Defense involvement would be necessary. As the Secretary of the Army is accountable to Congress for the logistical sustainment of all Army forces, as outlined in *Title 10*, reassignment of Army assets to support joint logistical requirements may interfere with these responsibilities, prompting higher authority involvement.

Although there are wartime clauses in JP 4-01.4 for the combatant commander to reorganize his logistical capabilities, there are no such luxuries for the service secretaries, and their lawful responsibilities do not change. Of interest is that *Title 10* does not offer the same wartime clause as joint doctrine for the combatant commanders.

### Findings

As current doctrine does not complement the lawful requirements delineated in *Title 10*, there is inadequate documentation that identifies the Army's inland transportation requirements to the USMC. No single document explicitly states what joint transportation support will be provided, who will provide it, who is responsible for it, or who will command and control it.

There were multiple departures from logistical doctrine during OIF. Planning indicated that the TSC would conduct significant line haul for Marine forces. When this capability fell short of expectations, Marine Corps logistical planners compensated with the use of contracted trucks, in order to meet their *Title 10* responsibilities of providing logistical support for their service component. By following law, they violated doctrine. Had these rented line haul assets withdrawn from the theater, Marine logistics would have been unable to support its forces, violating JP 4-07. MLC also disregarded the principles laid out in DOD Directive 4500.9, which states that the Secretary of the Army will "coordinate the planning and requirements for the use of DOD-controlled land

transportation equipment and facilities.” MLC further ignored this directive by retaining control of these contracted assets that, as expressed above, should have been passed to ARFOR. But had MLC met the requirements in the directive, or joint publications, it would have failed in its *Title 10* responsibility. If directives and doctrine do not support law, or hinder commanders in the performance of their duties, then significant rewrite is necessary.

Currently there is no single source document that identifies the Army’s logistical responsibilities to combatant commanders or other services. And frankly, a document that listed these requirements would be of limited value as every operation evolves differently, force flow into theater would vary from operation to operation, and the ebb and flow of forces would require logistical responsibilities to vary, based on many different factors. These factors include the flow of forces into theater, reserve mobilization requirements and availability of host nation contractor support, to name but a few.

As previous indicated in BGen Lehnert’s Marine Corps Gazette article “MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield,” the TSC was unable to meet its line haul requirements to the USMC. With a significant portion of MLC lift coming from contracted vehicles, MLC filled the line haul shortfall, and OIF logistics was a success story. But this success of logistical operations underscores the limitations of doctrine. Had MLC followed doctrine by submitting all logistical shortfalls to the JFC and relying on the TSC to meet their required theater logistical responsibilities, the logistical tale of OIF would have been one of complete failure.

The Army theater support structure, as currently organized, is woefully incapable of adequately supporting other service components. The reserve call up time of the bulk of the TSC's personnel is a major hurdle, especially when you consider that the majority of logistical preparation for operations occurs during JRSOI. It is important to note that reserve call up requires that Congress authorize the mobilization of reserve forces. These forces then need 90 days to prepare for deployment. If the majority of logistical forces are the last to arrive in theater, due to their reserve status, the preponderance of JRSOI will already be complete. The indirect designation of the TSC as the JRSOI responsible agent in JP 4-01.8 is ludicrous when you consider the standard flow of reserve personnel into theater. Service component commanders must maintain the flexibility that law allows in order to meet the ever-changing logistical requirements of their forces.

Army service doctrine is in similar need of revision. The confusion of delineation of logistical responsibilities between ARFOR and joint forces, by the very name of the organization, only adds to difficulties in planning and execution of the joint logistics plan. Theater Support Command, as per service doctrine FM 4-93.4, is an Army organization, responsible for "operational-level support functions, based on the ASCC commander's plan and subsequent guidance." However the same doctrine states that the TSC is designated as the theater operational lead for logistics, and has multiple CUL responsibilities. This designation is based on joint doctrine that states that the COMARFOR must "provide common item and common service support to other components as required; Provide common-user land transportation in theater to include rail otherwise designated by the CINC; and, Provide management of distribution assets and prioritize movement requirements and mode asset utilization" (JP 4-01.4, II-8). If the

organization is incapable of meeting the requirement, then either the requirement needs revision, or the organization needs improving.

### Research Answers

The primary question posed by this research – “Does the need exist to clarify or amend the existing laws, directives, joint, multi-service and Army doctrine in order to facilitate adequate identification of inland transportation support requirements and responsibilities in joint operations?” is predicated on determining answers to the secondary questions, which are as follows:

1. What is the current state of documentation that identifies the Army’s inland transportation support requirements to the USMC?
2. What were the inland transportation support requirements/ understandings of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and where they met?
3. Is the current Army theater support structure adequately organized to support the inland transportation requirements of the USMC?

As previously determined, current law, directives and doctrine are not currently clear on what the Army’s inland transportation support requirements to the USMC are. In order to meet the lawful requirements as per *Title 10*, MLC had to violate several DOD Directives and joint publications. This “violation” was an absolute requirement in order to meet support functions documented by law. The inland transportation support requirements/ understandings of OIF have been previously discussed, and the necessity of MLC to compensate for the logistical shortfalls of the TSC is well documented. And finally, the TSC, as tasked and organized under the ASCC/COMARFOR is not adequately organized to support the inland transportation requirements of the USMC.

### Conclusion

The logistical success of USMC forces in OIF was due to the commanders' adherence to law, with the willful violation of joint doctrine and DOD Directives. However, the availability of HN assets to meet the line haul requirements of the MARFOR is not a capability that should be relied upon in future operations. When joint doctrine and DOD Directives are circumvented in order to meet the lawful requirements of a service component, significant rewrite of both doctrine and directives is required. And when service doctrine assigns responsibilities and capabilities to organizations that are unable to fulfill these requirements as currently organized, significant rewrite is required, or the organization designated to meet these requirements needs an overhaul.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

Logistics professionals inherently find solutions to supply and distribution problems. The success of logistics during OIF was no exception. Asset visibility inefficiencies, insufficient repair parts, the inadequacies of just-in-time logistics, sand storms, shortage of qualified drivers, and a host of other dilemmas thrown the logisticians way were all overcome, and the war fighters had sufficient supplies and equipment to accomplish the mission. The success of the first three phases of OIF is not in question, however the dilemmas caused by having to compensate for inaccurate planning, and failure to meet joint and service doctrine standards are.

#### Research Question

Currently joint doctrine does not complement *Title 10*. Joint doctrine provides the combatant commander wartime authority to adjust his logistical assets to support the entire theater. The service component commander's (SCC) have no such luxury, and are always responsible for the logistical support of their forces in theater. So even if the JTF commander establishes a common user-land transportation agreement, the SCC must plan for the failure of that agreement, as the ultimate responsibility for logistical success of the force, as per *Title 10*, lies with the SCC. The presence of these redundant capabilities, required by the SCC out of necessity, violates the principle of reduction of duplicative capabilities laid out in joint doctrine.

Another problem with the current capabilities is the force structure designed to tackle the theater logistical issues. The Army's Theater Support Command (TSC) is

woefully incapable of performing the joint mission that it is assigned to accomplish. As an ARFOR organization, the TSC's primary mission is to support the COMARFOR *Title 10* responsibilities of providing logistical support to the Army forces in theater. Should missions arise that detract from the primary focus of ARFOR support, the TSC commander must deconflict priorities and either not support the external requirement, or tell his boss, the ARFOR commander, that ARFOR missions will not be accomplished due to joint or coalition requirements for TSC assets. Should the TSC commander be assigned the additional duty of ARFOR commander, as is often the case, the primary responsibility of meeting the ARFOR commanders *Title 10* responsibility would still take precedence over any external requirement.

#### Recommendations

If theater level logistics are going to succeed and meet the requirements as specified by law, directives, and doctrine, something needs to change. Firstly, law, directives and doctrine need to complement each other. Overlapping and unclear responsibilities leave combatant commanders, type commanders, and service component commanders competing for commercial host-nation support assets and vying for priority of support and lift into theater. Secondly, one commander should be given the responsibility for theater level logistics (figure 4). All theater level logistical assets provide by the SCC should be provided to the combatant commander, and then sub-delegated to a JTF logistics commander. The responsibility for theater level distribution, joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI), common user logistics (CUL), common item support (CIS), common user land transportation, and others, would fall squarely on the shoulders of the JTF commander for logistics, and

unity of effort would be accomplished by unity of command. As figure 4 indicates, the responsibility of the Joint Force CSS Component Commander would be as the task force provider and coordinator of theater level logistics. All deconfliction of theater logistical assets, integration of supplies, host-nation contracts, and others, would occur in this organization.




Figure 4. Proposed Functional Component Alignment

### Implications

If theater level logistics is going to be efficient, effective, and non-duplicative, then one organization must be assigned the overall responsibility of coordination. Much like the J-3 directs operations, moving combat forces around the battlefield, the JTF

commander for logistics should have overarching authority for logistics. The movement of supplies is essential to any operation. It is impossible to win a war if you cannot get to where the action is, and sustain the forces once it is there. Having an organization capable of influencing the theater logistical stance (that is the entire joint theater, not just Army theater) would increase efficiency immeasurably.

A preponderance of this organization must also be capable of arriving in theater simultaneously with the force-opening package to execute the myriad of support functions required for JRSOI, logistical buildup, and host nation contract negotiations. The current reliance on reserve forces to meet the theater sustainment requirement proved unreliable during OIF, and future operations will probably have even less opportunity for force build up. Reliance on reserve forces to make up a preponderance of combat service support forces in future full spectrum operations needs to be revisited, and adequate CSS capability needs to be available from active duty forces to meet the immediate needs of the combatant commanders.

This Joint Logistics Task Force would also have the capability to fulfill many, if not all, of the monitoring and command and control of asset missions assigned to the JTF/CJTF commanders J/CJ-4. With multiple service component logistical organizations moving sustainment supplies throughout the theater, assigning overall asset and supply monitoring to a joint agency would allow for the cross-leveling of supplies from one service to another, and the ability to ensure accurate accountability of all cross-leveled supplies.

The primary difficulty with forming a Joint Logistics Task Force, or joint forces combat service support (CSS) component commander (JFCCC), would be staffing it and

designating forces to it. As the combatant commander has directive authority for logistics, moving forces from the SCC to the JFCCC would be relatively simple. However, the service component commanders would argue that re-designation of their service specific logistical assets as joint logistical assets would degrade their ability to directly support their services forces. Designation of Corps (i.e.: Corps Support Command) and Marine Expeditionary Force (i.e.: MLC) level assets as service specific assets would eliminate this concern. Logistical assets above this level, or those designated to be of a duplicative nature, would be assigned to the JFCCC. As the majority of the TSC is organized to perform this joint mission, re-designation as a joint-TSC, once the removal of all non-joint assets is complete, would be appropriate.

Staffing this joint-TSC could also prove problematic. Having joint officers on its staff would be required. Subject matter experts on service specific logistical requirements, capabilities and shortfalls would be paramount. A designated Commanding General from one service with a Deputy Commanding General from another would be optimum, and filling staff positions from across the joint spectrum would ensure the requirements of each service would be addressed.

#### Recommendations For Further Study

The make-up of the joint force logistics command will require significant study. The designation of a functional commander for logistics, equivalent to the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is no small undertaking, and allocating forces to this Joint Force Logistics Command will be problematic at best. The majority of forces assigned would still need to be Army forces, and the current makeup of these type forces is still resident in the

Reserve component. Joint force opening packages, contracting support, theater distribution management, and others, would need to be corner stones of this joint organization. Having one individual commander responsible for the entire operational/theater level logistical effort is paramount to the success of the joint logistical effort. Current doctrine sufficiently identifies the service component commanders' logistical organizations, and the support capabilities required of these forces. What is not adequately identified is the requirement of a joint theater logistical agency responsible for bridging the gap between the supporting commands and agencies, such as USTRANSCOM and DLA, to the JTF/CJTF commanders AOR. Establishment of standing joint theater support commands, just the command structure, or designating a standing organization/command to fulfill this role on an as required basis, much the same as service component commands assume the duties of JFLCC or JFACC, are topics that require further study.

### Summary

The current inland transportation support requirements placed on the service secretaries, combatant commanders and service component commanders are duplicative, contradictory, and unclear. Significant recommendations need to be made to Congress to amend *Title 10* to include a wartime clause relieving the service components of logistical responsibility in a combatant commanders theater, and assigning that responsibility to the combatant commander. Of course assignment of logistical forces sufficient to sustain all combat forces assigned to the combatant commander still needs to be assured. Joint and Army doctrine needs to make clear delineation between a theater support command with joint responsibilities, and an Army theater support command. Much like the MLC is

assigned theater logistical responsibilities for Marine forces, current Theater Support Commands need to be renamed Army Theater Support Commands, and assigned the same responsibilities for Army forces only. The future designation of a joint logistics command, under the JTF commander would allow for a single commander to take on the myriad of joint theater level logistical requirements, essential in bridging the gap between strategic level logistical organizations, such as USTRANSCOM and DLA, and the theater level operational logistical forces.

## REFERENCE LIST

- Chadwick, Robert L., LTCOL, USA. 1999. A Joint Logistics Command: Is It Needed? Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 27 May.
- Chairmen of The Joint Chief of Staff. 1999. Manual 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*. Vol. 2, *Planning Formats and Guidance w/ Change 1*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 December.
- Cousins, William R., and Roger Houck. 1999. Reserve Component Roles and Missions in the Revolution in Military Logistics. *Army Logistician* vol. 31, issue 1 (January-February): page 15.
- Department of the Army. 1993. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 31 May.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999. Field Manual 100-10-1, *Theater Distribution*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001a. Field Manual 1, *The Army*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001b. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003a. Field Manual 3-93 draft, *The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003b. Field Manual 4-93.4, *Theater Support Command*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 15 April.
- Department of Army and US Marine Corps. 2001. Field Manual 3-31.1 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-36, *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA. and Quantico VA.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command/Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 21 November 2001.
- Department of Defense. 1987. Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 September.



- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989. DOD Directive 4500.9, *Transportation and Traffic Management*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 26 January.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002. Directive 5101.1, *DOD Executive Agent*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 03 September.
- Edwards, Thomas J., and Dr. Rich Eden. 1998. *Velocity Management and the Revolution in Military Logistics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center.
- Fleet Marine Force Manual 4, *Combat Service Support*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, headquarters United States Marine Corps, 17 August 1988.
- FM 1. 2001a. *See* Department of the Army. 2001a.
- FM 3. 2001b. *See* Department of the Army. 2001b.
- FM 4-93.4. 2003b. *See* Department of the Army. 2003.
- FM 13-93. 2003a. *See* Department of the Army. 2003a.
- FM 100-5. 1993. *See* Department of the Army. 1993.
- FM 100-7. 1995. *See* Department of the Army. 1995.
- FM 100-10-1. 1999. *See* Department of the Army. 1999.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1996. Joint Publication 4-01.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 Oct.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1999. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000a. Joint Publication 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 April.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000b. Joint Publication 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2000c. Joint Publication 4-01.4, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 August.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001a. Joint Publication 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Common User Logistics*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001b. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002a. Joint Publication 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 April.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002b. Joint Publication 4-01.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Transportation Terminal Operations*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 April.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003. Joint Publication 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 March 2003.
- JP 0-2. 2001. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001.
- JP 3-33. 1999 *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999.
- JP 4-0. 2000a. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000a.
- JP 4-01. 2003. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003.
- JP 4-01.2. 1996. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996.
- JP 4-01.3. 2002a. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2002a.
- JP 4-01.4. 2000c. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000c.
- JP 4-01.5. 2002b. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2002b.
- JP 4-01.8. 2000b. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000b.
- JP 4-07. 2001a. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2001a.
- Lehnert, Michael R., and John Wissler. 2003. MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield. *Marine Corps Gazette* vol. 87, series no. 8 (August): page 30.
- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 4, *Logistics*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1997.
- Pate, Steven W., MAJ, USA. 1997. Joint Logistics at the Operational Level: Where Are We at and Where Are We Going? Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 22 May.
- Peters, Katherine McIntire. 2002. Army Chief Says Logistics Reform Is Vital. *Early Bird*, 4 September. Article on-line. Available from *GovExec.com*.
- Shalikashvili, John M. n.d. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thorpe, George C. 1986. *Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

United States, Congress, *Title 10, United States Code*. Washington, DC: United States Congress, Various.

Usher, Edward G. 2003. Brute Force Combat Service Support: 1st Force Service Support Group in Operation Iraqi Freedom. *Marine Corps Gazette* vol. 87, series no. 8 (August): page 34.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
250 Gibbon Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA  
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

LTC James O. Coogle  
DLRO  
USACGSC  
1 Reynolds Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. David W. Christie  
DJMO  
USACGSC  
1 Reynolds Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Dennis L. Dolan  
CTAC  
USACGSC  
1 Reynolds Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

## CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004
2. Thesis Author: Joseph Kevin White
3. Thesis Title: The Army's Inland Transportation Support Requirements To The United States Marine Corps.

4. Thesis Committee Members:

Signatures:

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

### EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
<u>Direct Military Support (10)</u>	/	<u>Chapter 3</u>	/	<u>12</u>
<u>Critical Technology (3)</u>	/	<u>Section 4</u>	/	<u>31</u>
<u>Administrative Operational Use (7)</u>	/	<u>Chapter 2</u>	/	<u>13-32</u>

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1 -R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).